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Abstract  20 
Results-oriented approaches are widely regarded as an effective means to improving 21 
cost-effectiveness of agri-climate-environment schemes. We designed a hypothetical 22 
payment-by-results scheme for biodiversity conservation on environmental grasslands 23 
in Finland. The scheme would pay farmers a premium if the site contains a set number 24 
of indicator species, which were selected based on vascular plant surveys of the target 25 
habitat type. We presented the hypothetical scheme to 20 farmers and six experts 26 
(researchers, officials and advisors) in agricultural policy for their opinions on the 27 
payment-by-result approach generally and the hypothetical scheme specifically. The 28 
indicator species list proved suitable for identifying sites with high total species 29 
richness of vascular plants and also appeared feasible in the eyes of the farmers. 30 
Farmers were mostly positive about the approach and, mainly, thought their peers and 31 
society at large would receive it positively. The main concerns were about 32 
implementation, especially verifying the biodiversity results. People working for the 33 
national control body were the most critical and could not see how the hypothetical 34 
scheme could fit into the current institutionalised programme. Experience in other 35 
countries may provide solutions for overcoming such obstacles. The results are highly 36 
relevant for a discourse on social experimentation and cost-efficient delivery of public 37 
goods for public money. 38 
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Highlights: 42 
- Potential for results-based agri-environment schemes is identified in Finland 43 
- Indicator species work well in identifying most species-rich grasslands. 44 
- Farmers are supportive of the results-based approach. 45 
- Officials working in administration are most critical of the results-based approach. 46 
- Main concerns with the approach are the implementation and verification of results. 47 
 48 
Introduction 49 
The agri-climate-environment schemes (AES) are the single most important tool for 50 
securing and improving the environmental and ecological state of the agricultural 51 
environments across the EU (EEA 2004, Batáry et al. 2015), including in Finland 52 
(Kaljonen 2011). As with any multi-objective policy tool, AES require constant 53 
development to remedy shortcomings. Among the most critical problem areas are the 54 
lack of incentives for achieving actual results, insufficient targeting, and difficulty in 55 
tailoring activities to diverse farm circumstances (e.g. Kleijn et al. 2011, Marggraf 56 
2003, Whittingham et al. 2007, Arponen et al. 2013, McKenzie et al. 2013). The 57 
European Court of Auditors (2011) found that objectives of many AES were not 58 
specific enough for assessing whether or not they had been achieved. Furthermore, by 59 
paying participants a flat-rate remuneration for pre-specified management (“action” or 60 
“management” oriented approach), the current scheme design discourages participants 61 
from striving for innovative and site-specific approaches (Burton and Schwartz 2013, 62 
Kaljonen 2006 and 2008). The approach not only dis-incentivises farmers (Kaljonen 63 
2006, Keenleyside et al. 2011), but makes their behaviour dependent on monetary 64 
stimuli at the expense of appreciation of results of their work (Herzon and Mikk 65 
2007). Verification is entirely in the hands of officials, who are often perceived as a 66 
threat (Birge and Herzon 2014, Helenius and Seppänen 2004, Wilson and Hart 2001).  67 
It is a widely held expert view that AES need to become more results-oriented 68 
(European Network for Rural Development and EC 2010). The European Court of 69 
Auditors (2011) recommendations to the European Commission for improving 70 
efficiency of AES include more precise targeting of measures and clearer objectives; 71 
tailoring more demanding measures to local circumstances; and creating clear 72 
indicators for measuring success. The report specifically recommends examining the 73 
usefulness of outcome-based, or payment-by-results (PBR), measures (ibid, pp. 49). 74 
Such results-based agri-environment payments are already in use in several member 75 
states, including Germany, France and The Netherlands (comprehensive list in Allen 76 
et al. 2014). These include paying landowners or other managing bodies for defined 77 
biodiversity or ecosystem results, either exclusively or as a bonus on top of a payment 78 
for management actions. The payment may be based, for example, on occurrence of a 79 
number of indicator species. The commonest approach is of a so-called ‘hybrid’ type 80 
(ibid), where active management by farmers and/or a list of prohibited actions are part 81 
of the scheme requirements, but the payment rate is dependent on the ecological 82 
results. Among the perceived benefits of the approach, results-based remuneration is 83 
said to i) increase farmer intrinsic interest in achieving environmental objectives, ii) 84 
provide greater opportunity for innovation and site-specific solutions, iii) increase 85 
cost-effectiveness both in AES payment and in land-use practices for environmental 86 
results and, iv) build “social capital” (Burton and Paragahawewa 2011, de Snoo et al. 87 
2013, Klimek et al. 2008, Matzdorf et. al 2008, Swagemakers et al. 2009, Matzdorf 88 
and Lorenz 2010, Schroeder et. al. 2013). The latter refers to appreciation of farmer 89 
know-how in environmental management within the farming community and results 90 
in long-term change in farmers’ behavior toward nature conservation.  91 
In most cases, results-based agri-environment payments target botanically-rich 92 
grasslands (Allen et al. 2014). The results are easier to verify and monitor for 93 
biodiversity than for nutrient run-offs, for example (Berniger 2012, Allen et al. 2014, 94 
Table 7). Examples of result-based payments enhancing biodiversity include MEKA 95 
Baden-Württemberg Grassland Scheme in Germany (Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010, 96 
Matzdorf et al. 2010, EC 2015a), Prairies fleuries programme in France (De Sainte 97 
Marie 2014), Burren Life programme in Ireland (Burren Life 2015), and Öko-98 
Qualitätsverordnung in Switzerland (Riedel et al. 2012). A similar approach to the 99 
Baden-Württemberg Scheme in Germany is under consideration in the UK (Schroeder 100 
et al. 2013). The payment level is linked to the occurrence of a progressively higher 101 
number of vascular plant species indicating extensive management and diverse plant 102 
communities. So far, there is no adaptation case of the approach to the northern 103 
agricultural environments, even if the potential benefits are large: In Finland, for 104 
example, production grasslands older than 5-years are rare (1.2 % of the utilized 105 
agricultural area; Natural Resources Institute Finland 2015), and semi-natural 106 
biotopes are fragmented remnants (Kemppainen and Lehtomaa 2009). However, 107 
uptake of AES is exceptionally high – 95% of agricultural land is under agri-108 
environmental commitments (Niemi and Ahlstedt 2014) (cf. 25% in the EU-27, EC 109 
2015b). Thus, AES have potentially very large impact on the ecological state of the 110 
agricultural environment. 111 
Experience in developing and evaluating the indicators, as well as attitudes and skills 112 
of participating parties, are among the most important factors to consider in 113 
determining the feasibility of the result-based approach (Allen et al. 2014). In 114 
determining indicator species, preparatory research is needed because any indicator 115 
species list must be suitable for the target habitat and relevant to specific bio-116 
geographical regions, but also broad enough that it is inclusive of the whole area 117 
covered by the scheme (ibid). 118 
The objective of this study is to develop and test two key issues in developing the 119 
results-based payment approach for biodiversity in Finland. We i) develop and assess 120 
the suitability of the biodiversity indicators, and ii) examine the range and 121 
commonality of opinions and perceptions of farmers, experts and policy officials in 122 
charge of the implementation of the agri-environmental schemes in Finland.   We 123 
developed a prototype for a PBR element in an existing AES, Nature Management 124 
Grassland (NMG), based on experiences gained from other European regions with 125 
PBR measures for biodiversity conservation (e.g. Bertke et al. 2008, Groth 2009, De 126 
Sainte Marie 2014). We selected indicators based on data on vascular plants from two 127 
previous studies in NMG fields (Toivonen et al. 2013, 2015). We further evaluated 128 
suitability of the indicator list as, on the one hand, proxies for botanic diversity in 129 
NMG, and, on the other, as a tool for farmer participation in a potential PBR scheme. 130 
Using the prototype as an example, we explored farmers’, experts’ and public 131 
officials’ opinions and perceptions about the proposed PBR measure. In our analysis 132 
we focus on the following questions: 133 
A. How well does the set of indicator species perform as a biodiversity indicator 134 
and as a tool for communicating with farmers and facilitating self-guided 135 
assessment?  136 
B. Is the idea of results-based payment for biodiversity conservation in NMG 137 
field accepted in principle? 138 
C. What are the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the prototype scheme 139 
presented, as compared to the existing management-based scheme? 140 
D. What type of capacity building is identified as necessary for the scheme?   141 
E. What is the perceived impact of the proposed scheme on reputation and public 142 
perception? 143 
 144 
Materials and methods 145 
Developing the prototype 146 
We built the prototype upon the existing NMG (or grassland type of Environmental 147 
Fallow as in Toivonen et al. 2013) under the Finnish agri-environmental schemes. 148 
NMG fields correspond to extensive grassland, for which results-based payments 149 
have been run in Germany (Matzdorf et al. 2008, Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010), France 150 
(De Sainte Marie 2013) and Switzerland (Riedel et al. 2012), and are under 151 
consideration in the UK (Schroeder et al. 2013). NMG fields in Finland are 152 
established with grassland seed mixtures and are kept in place for at least two years. 153 
Farmers can also enrol old grasslands as NMG without sowing. Management 154 
restrictions include prohibition of fertilisers and pesticides. Mowing is required every 155 
second year in all parcels. NMG fields can be used for production purposes, both as 156 
source of fodder and as pasture. However, NMG fields are frequently managed as 157 
arable fallows in which mown material may be left on site to decompose. Currently, 158 
the NMG scheme occupies 4% of the Finnish agricultural area and is present on 46% 159 
of Finnish farms (Natural Resources Institute Finland, pers. comm.). With permanent 160 
grass, the NMG scheme promotes both biodiversity and water protection. As a policy 161 
instrument, the NMG scheme is, however, considered one of the most important tools 162 
in enhancing common biodiversity in the agricultural areas (Kuussaari et al. 2013, 163 
Herzon et al. 2012).  164 
Previous research demonstrated a considerable variation in plant species diversity 165 
among NMG fields (from 5 to over 50 species per field on a sample area: Toivonen et 166 
al. 2013). Many long-term NMG have highly naturalised vegetation (Herzon et al. 167 
2012) and provide valuable habitats for butterflies, bumblebees and birds in the 168 
agricultural landscape (Toivonen et al. 2015, 2016). However, the current scheme 169 
does not distinguish between diverse old grasslands and rotational grasslands – from 170 
2015 onwards, support is 100 €/ha to all parcels. Previously, inspectors considered 171 
natural vegetation as “weeds”, and payment could be withdrawn on this basis (Finnish 172 
Agency for Rural Affairs, pers. comm.). Presently, the programming document 173 
explicitly states that naturalized vegetation is allowed. However, a requirement of 174 
obligatory mowing in cases of weeds remains vague since it is not specified which 175 
species constitute “weeds”. Vague management guidelines such as these are one 176 
factor hindering the scheme from realising its considerable biodiversity potential. At 177 
its worst, excessive mowing at the peak of the breeding season may turn the 178 
grasslands into ecological traps (Battin 2004). The prescription-based scheme also 179 
sends a contradictory message that farmers on the one hand should manage to support 180 
biodiversity and on the other simultaneously avoid open-to-interpretation weed 181 
infestation. 182 
We designed the test scheme as a hybrid scheme in which the baseline conditions for 183 
retaining the NMG for the minimum of two years and not applying chemical inputs 184 
would remain as they are presently. However, the bonus payment would be paid if the 185 
site were found to contain a set number of plant species indicating high nature value. 186 
Farmers would be responsible for self-monitoring twice during the agreement of five 187 
years. Results of the monitoring would be the basis for the normal subsidy 188 
application. The sites would be subject to normal agri-environmental inspection (i.e. a 189 
percentage of farmers are inspected annually and particular agreements verified). 190 
Extension services and materials for farmer and inspector capacity-building in species 191 
identification and best management would be available.  192 
For developing the set of indicator plant species that correspond to Finnish conditions 193 
and type of vegetation under focus, we used botanical data from two previous studies 194 
(Toivonen et al. 2013, 2015). The studies ran on several types of environmental 195 
fallow fields but, for this work, we extracted the data only for the grassland option. In 196 
the first study, vegetation survey was performed in 104 NMG of various ages in three 197 
regions (Toivonen et al. 2013). Vascular plants were surveyed on one to four 12.5-m 198 
transects per field (Toivonen et al. 2013). A total of 185 vascular plant species or 199 
pseudospecies were registered. In the second study, vegetation data were collected 200 
from 20 NMG that were at least eight years old (Toivonen et al. 2015). There, 201 
vascular plants were surveyed on two 50-m long transects (Toivonen et al. 2015). The 202 
total number of registered species was 145. The second study gave us a better 203 
understanding of the species pool on sites that are most likely to reach the diversity 204 
level required for the bonus payment, that is, relatively long-term NMG fields. In both 205 
studies, transects were placed systematically by the criteria agreed in advance, and 206 
vegetation was always sampled both along field margins (on the field side) and in the 207 
middle of the field (Toivonen et al. 2013, 2015). Full species lists from both studies 208 
are available in the respective publications. 209 
Several criteria were used in selecting potential indicator species (cf. Matzdorf et al. 210 
2009, Magda et al. 2015): i) indication of species-rich communities and extensive 211 
management; ii) ease of recognition for a lay person with help of images; iii) species 212 
occurrence across the country and across a range of abiotic conditions typical for the 213 
field type; iv) frequency of occurrence in grassland communities of the focal field 214 
type; v) not a difficult agronomic weed. Details of inclusion and exclusion of specific 215 
species are presented in the Appendix Table A2. 216 
The initial screening produced 42 species that correspond to the criteria above, of 217 
which we pooled several closely related species into species groups, as they can be 218 
confused by non-specialists (farmers) (Table A.1). The final list of indicator species 219 
included 24 species and species groups. Including both common and infrequent 220 
species would give most potential participants a chance of detecting at least a few of 221 
the indicators on most of the NMG fields and might motivate them to “achieve” more 222 
through adaptive management. 223 
We designed a leaflet for farmers that outlines the bonus scheme and provides a visual 224 
tool to aid discussion and to function as a guide to the 24 indicator species (Appendix 225 
A). The guide has names and photographs of the indicator species.    226 
For the statistical analysis, we used the data from the vegetation survey of 104 NMG 227 
fields in three regions (Toivonen et al. 2013). We related the mean number of 228 
indicator species per field with total species number, and with field number and area 229 
using linear correlation in IBM SPSS Statistics 23 (IBM Corp 2015). We evaluated 230 
the potential coverage of the fields qualifying for the bonus payment and potential 231 
budgetary expenses under alternative threshold values of a minimum number of the 232 
indicator species. 233 
 234 
Interviews and site visits 235 
We used a mixed methods approach (Creswell et al. 2003, Yin 2014) for assessing the 236 
responses of farmers, public officials and experts to the prototype scheme. The 237 
empirical material is composed of two sets: 1) semi-structured interviews and site 238 
visits for ecological observation with farmers from the Uusimaa region in southern 239 
Finland, and 2) semi-structured interviews and questionnaires with public officials 240 
and experts at multiple administrative levels (Appendices B and C – both interview 241 
forms). We based farmer selection on diversity and expert selection on known 242 
expertise in AES policy development, implementation and research.  243 
 244 
Farmer responses  245 
We chose the Uusimaa region for gathering the farmer responses because it is an 246 
important farming region of more than 3000 farms, the majority of which specialise in 247 
cereal production (1804 cereal farms in total) (Natural Resources Institute Finland 248 
2016). NMG scheme is particularly relevant for farms without animal production 249 
because of its flexible management that does not require harvesting of biomass or 250 
grazing of the sites (as is the case with grassed buffer zones). The scheme is also 251 
especially important ecologically in cereal-dominated regions in which grassland 252 
parcels are otherwise infrequent. 253 
We selected farmers from a sample of 92 farms with NMG in Uusimaa Province 254 
provided to us by the Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 255 
We selected farms with multiple NMG sites because these farmers would have broad 256 
experience on various sites to draw on when assessing the prototype.  257 
We sent letters to 47 farmers describing the research and inviting them to participate. 258 
Eight farmers contacted us and we included them in the study. We telephoned the 259 
remaining farmers for participation. To ensure variety between the farms, we grouped 260 
the farmers by municipality to ensure geographic distribution and aimed to include 261 
women, organic farms and livestock farms in our sample.  262 
We reached a total of 33 farmers by telephone (a further 6 did not answer the calls), 263 
resulting in another 12 interviews. Of the 33 contacted by telephone, 12 declined to be 264 
interviewed, mainly due to time constraints, and 2 stated they would only be available 265 
for interview after the growing season. Table 1 summarises the farmers interviewed 266 
according to production type, farming “employment” status and number of NMG 267 
parcels under management. Of the farmers interviewed, 9 were 30-49 years old and 268 
11 were aged 50-69 (mean age category: 45-50 years old). Primary production was 269 
cereals for all except two of the farms. However, the farms included present the range 270 
of farming contexts in the Uusimaa region, such as full vs. part-time farming, organic 271 
vs. conventional production and fields situated far from the farmstead vs clustered 272 
around the farm. Several of the cereals farms also had grazing animals. 273 
Primary 
production type 
Full-time1 
farmers 
Part-time2 
farmers 
Number of NMG fields (incl. rented) 
Conventional, 
cereals 
13 5 (incl. the 
only  female 
farmer) 
Median: 7 
Range: 3-20 
Conventional, 
specialty crops 
1  6 
 274 
Table 1 Summary of the farmers interviewed. 275 
1Full-time includes in some cases farm-based machinery operation businesses (e.g. snow ploughing, 276 
digging) 2Part-time – primary employment is off-farm; includes self-described hobby farmer 277 
 278 
Farmer interview procedure  279 
We interviewed the farmers using an interview guide and key themes. We audio 280 
recorded the interviews with permission of the interviewees. Interview themes 281 
included attitudinal (e.g. willingness to engage with bonus payments, perceived 282 
benefits and problems), institutional (e.g. challenges in terms of administration and 283 
delivery, incl. advisory), and financial aspects (adequate level(s) of payments 284 
(Appendix B). We asked background information on the farm and farmer before 285 
continuing to discussion of current and past nature management and other possible 286 
AES contracts. We presented the prototype scheme to the interviewees and asked 287 
about their interest in such a scheme. We asked targeted questions about e.g. possible 288 
participation, feasibility of the presented idea and what would be needed for such an 289 
idea to succeed. We also asked how the farmer felt others (society and peers) would 290 
perceive the scheme. The final part of the interview focused on the interviewee’s 291 
conceptualisation of “good farmer” and whether the NMG scheme fit into such a 292 
conceptualisation (Appendix B). Interview time averaged over 1 hour. We conducted 293 
interviews in Finnish, and in seven of the interviews a spouse or someone else 294 
involved in the farming participated for at least part of the interview. The majority of 295 
interviews (17/20) were conducted by two authors, with the same researcher leading 296 
the interview in all cases. In most cases (17/20), interviews were followed by a visit to 297 
an NMG field of the farmers’ choosing, where we continued discussion of the 298 
proposed prototype as we walked across the field with the farmers looking for the 299 
indicator species.  300 
 301 
Public official and advisor interviews 302 
Organic, cereals 1  3 
Organic, dairy 1  6 
We chose experts based on their known expertise in administration or advisory of 303 
AES and, specifically, AES for biodiversity conservation. Hence, in choosing the 304 
public officials and experts, we did not use  geographical determinants. We 305 
interviewed representatives of the key actors, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and 306 
Forestry, Agency for Rural Affairs, regional administration, advisory services, 307 
Farmers’ Union and environmental NGOs (altogether six interviewees). These 308 
interviews focused on evaluating the potentials and possibilities of PBR measures in 309 
the Finnish policy context. We contacted potential interviewees by telephone or email 310 
and then sent them the background information and a set of questions. Afterwards we 311 
met with respondents face-to-face or via Skype video call and discussed the issues. 312 
One respondent preferred to send the response in writing and declined a request for a 313 
meeting. Interviews took place after the farmer interviews. After interview questions, 314 
we presented preliminary results from work with the farmers to see if it brought in 315 
new themes and reactions from the expert stakeholders. 316 
 317 
Analysis of the interviews 318 
Analysis of farmer interviews started with a summarising practice similar to that 319 
described by Schroeder et al. (2013, citing Mayring 2008) and was followed by a 320 
modified version of theoretical thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006) according 321 
to the topics presented in Introduction. Firstly, we recorded our initial impressions of 322 
the interviews immediately post-interview. At this stage we noted key points, new or 323 
repeated information, and attitude toward the topic. We assessed how well the 324 
interviewee understood the prototype scheme and how trustworthy their responses 325 
were (veracity, how well-considered or thought-out). Secondly, we produced a 326 
summary of the interview experience and key findings. Thirdly, we listened to the 327 
interviews, produced partial transcriptions, and made note of the emerging themes, 328 
answers to the quantitative questions, and the major points of the key themes 329 
discussed. The dataset from experts and officials is shorter in comparison to farmer 330 
interviews. For analysis, we extracted the key themes and points from the interviews.  331 
We classified the quality of the fields visited with farmers into three categories for 332 
likelihood of achieving the hypothetical bonus-payment, based on the number of the 333 
indicator species: i) “meets requirements” (seven or more indicator species), ii) “could 334 
meet requirements with reasonable effort” (less than seven indicator species but a 335 
field is suitable in terms of its history and current vegetation type), and iii) “highly 336 
unlikely to meet requirements without considerable effort” (few, if any indicator 337 
species, high cover of species indicating nutrient-rich conditions or dominated by 338 
commercial seed plants). 339 
 340 
Results 341 
Indicator species evaluation 342 
The mean number of the suggested indicator species per NMG field was 3.2 and 343 
maximum was 11 species. The number of indicator species strongly correlated with 344 
total number of vascular plant species per plot (Pearson r = 0.745, p< 0.000; one-345 
tailed) (Fig. 1). The number of indicator species also positively correlated with field 346 
area (Pearson r = 0.318 p<0.001; one-tailed).  347 
 348 
 349 
Fig. 1. Linear correlation between number of vascular plant species per field and number of indicator 350 
species in nature management grasslands in Finland. The vegetation data come from Toivonen et al. 351 
(2013) (n = 104). 352 
 353 
The percentage of the number of fields that would qualify for the bonus payment and 354 
their combined area linearly declined with increasing threshold number of indicator 355 
species (Fig. 2). With six species as a threshold, the eligible number of fields would 356 
consist of about 20% of the total NMG parcels and 30% of the combined area. With 357 
seven species as a threshold, about 10% of fields, covering 10% of NMG area, would 358 
have qualified.  359 
 360 
 361 
Fig. 2. Percentage of the a) number of nature management grassland fields and b) their area that would 362 
have qualified for the bonus payment based on a progressively increased threshold number of the 363 
indicator species. Vegetation data comes from Toivonen et al. (2013) (n = 104). 364 
  365 
Mean number of plant species was 25 species for all fields. Fields which would have 366 
qualified for the bonus payment based on the threshold of seven indicator species had 367 
on average 42 species per field.  368 
Modelling of the potential eligible area for the bonus payment and resulting budgetary 369 
expense demonstrated that the optimum of biodiversity gain (in terms of local species 370 
numbers) related to the expense is in the threshold of seven species (Fig. 3). If the 371 
bonus payment is set at, for example, 50 € per hectare, the NMG measure would draw 372 
an additional 0.5 million € from the agri-environmental programme. This would 373 
channel about 5% of the total current expenditure on the measure to retention and 374 
management of parcels with nearly double mean species richness per plot compared 375 
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to the scheme overall. The costs of paying the bonus can also be related to species as a 376 
unit of biodiversity. In this case, bonus for fields would target from 59 to 182 species 377 
accumulated over the whole fields potentially chosen (Fig. 3). The cost per unit in 378 
both cases drops at seven indicator species.  379 
 380 
Fig. 3. Budgetary expense for the premium payment related to a) the mean number of species and b) 381 
the cumulative number of species in the potentially chosen fields, as a function of the threshold number 382 
of indicator species. The bonus payment is set to 50 € per hectare. Vegetation data comes from 383 
Toivonen et al. (2013) (n = 104).  384 
 385 
Farmer participation in the NMG scheme 386 
Farmers’ reasons for participating in the NMG scheme were mainly related to 387 
convenience and low production value of the fields: NMG were often small, wet, 388 
oddly shaped, highly shadowed by forest, or far away from the farmstead (cf. Herzon 389 
et al. 2012). Most of the farmers had long-term NMG, and some also established 390 
NMG as part of their crop rotation. Farmers commonly adjusted to a greening 391 
requirement under the Common Agriculture Policy for the Ecological Focus Area by 392 
placing some of the former NMG into this obligatory field type. This practice was 393 
common amongst grain farms lacking other land use (e.g. pasture, leguminous crops) 394 
to fulfil the requirement. 395 
 396 
Farmer acceptance of the potential payment-by-result option  397 
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Initial farmer responses to the PBR prototype scheme fell into three categories: 398 
immediate positive attitude (14), immediate negative attitude (2) and equivocal (4) 399 
(sample of responses in Table 2). Eight farmers used ‘smart’, ‘interesting/interested’ 400 
or ‘good’ in their response. Rather than giving a clearly positive or negative response, 401 
‘equivocal’ farmers responded with questions, such as how to establish the indicator 402 
species and how inspection/documentation would work in practice. Negative 403 
responses were based on the scheme being perceived as ‘too bureaucratic’. There was 404 
no clear difference based on ages, farm size or education level. 405 
The farmers, in general, approved of the idea of payments being linked to specific 406 
results. It was generally regarded as a fair approach. Farmers mainly were not able to 407 
propose their own measures to achieve the biodiversity goal proposed here. Some 408 
farmers (as well as experts) compared the approach to another scheme that targets 409 
semi-natural vegetation on so-called traditional rural biotopes and noted that the 410 
bonus measure for NMG has fewer management demands and, thus, a lower threshold 411 
for participation.  412 
 413 
Table 2 Sample of the initial responses from farmers to the proposed bonus scheme, including 414 
description of the farmer and whether the nature management grassland visited was suitable for the 415 
bonus. Response classifications are positive (pos), negative (neg), and equivocal (equiv). 416 
Farmer 
description: 
age, sex, field 
area, other work 
Field’s 
suitability 
for  the 
bonus y/n* 
Response 
class 
First impressions 
Over 35, 100 ha 
+ another 
business  
y Pos An interesting idea. It would bring more income 
but also more biodiversity… also more work. I 
would consider it. 
Over 60, 42 ha n Pos Why not? Farmers have done stranger things to get 
subsidies than count flowers. 
Over 35, 150 ha n Pos It sounds smart. Now when they’ve been mown 
it’s not necessarily so good for those plants. 
Over 50, female, 
35.5 ha + 
employed full 
time off-farm  
y Pos It doesn’t sound like such a big job. We go out 
walking there sometimes anyway. 
Over 30, 255 ha y Pos Could be interesting. Clearly different than what 
has come before. For example, I've never been told 
about these [indicator] plants before. 
Over 45, 150 ha 
+ heavy 
y Equiv The nature management fields are so 
different…some of them sure, there’s plenty of 
machinery job 
off-farm 
species, others–there’s not much without sowing 
the seeds and then the cost has to be compensated. 
Over 40, 260 ha y Neg Payment is, of course interesting, but my first 
impression is that it sounds too bureaucratic. The 
whole AES scheme already has so many nuances 
and different directions. 
*y= >7 indicator species found during site visit 417 
 418 
Farmer concerns or reasons not to accept payment-by-result 419 
Concerns focused on the proposed prototype, rather than payment-by-result approach 420 
generally, and mainly on implementation in practice (Table 3). The main concern was 421 
verifying the results in a consistent way for both farmers and inspectors. Farmers 422 
suggested several technical or management-based solutions, such as documenting 423 
indicator species by taking gps & time-stamped photos on smart phones and creating 424 
‘sections’ within parcels to pinpoint species for special management for conservation 425 
(indicator species) or control (e.g. thistles). A farmer who was formerly an inspector 426 
for the state agency overseeing agriculture subsidy payments was initially highly 427 
critical of the approach for its lack of prescribed management actions, asserting that 428 
farmers need rules to follow and inspectors need actions to evaluate.  429 
 430 
Table 3 main concerns about results-based approach brought up by the farmers. The most common 431 
concern is in bold. 432 
Theme Concerns 
Cost  Where will the money come from for farmer training?  
 
Will the bonus cover the cost of purchasing seeds, extra management, loss 
of other crop/land use? 
Farmer capacity: knowledge Learning new management skills to propagate, identify, target species  
Farmer capacity: time Time commitment- more effort for management 
Extension 
Will the training be sufficient, what kind of support (contact information, 
materials) will there be? 
Inspection & verification Farmer & inspector must have same criteria and result.  
Governance Commitment to contract & options if it doesn't work out. 
 
Farm planning period, including subsidy applications, vs. knowing if site 
successfully meets the requirements; 
Land use If bonus is too attractive, good farmland could be taken out of production;  
 
Aesthetics, appropriate 'placement' for NMG;  
 433 
 Implementation: prerequisites and capacity building 434 
Though the approach would not stipulate management, most farmers were keen to 435 
receive advice for best management. Some voiced specific concerns about 436 
neighbours’ disapproval of “weeds” or neglect of sites. Three farmers stressed the role 437 
of good marketing and packaging of the measure for farmer acceptance.  438 
Among the farmers, being unsure about best management practices and associated 439 
work for improving the nature value of the NMG was more of a concern than carrying 440 
out self-monitoring of indicator species. Many farmers did not see species monitoring 441 
as a burden, with some pointing out that they walk in their fields regardless and others 442 
saying that it can be a pleasant break to go out in the field on a nice day to look for the 443 
indicator species and that it could even be done with their children or grandchildren.  444 
Most farmers were able to correctly identify the fields potentially suitable for the 445 
bonus payment (Table A.1), even if they were not otherwise knowledgeable about the 446 
plant species chosen as indicators. According to their own assessment and based on 447 
reactions to the indicator species brochure, few (<5) farmers exhibited, or thought 448 
someone else in their household had, sufficient knowledge to carry out the self-449 
monitoring of the indicator species at the time of the interviews. However, most 450 
interviewees stressed that their professional background provided them with enough 451 
know-how to successfully complete the task with supporting extension materials. 452 
Though all farmers mentioned the need for extension services, most wanted the 453 
training to be ‘light’ (it ‘comes out of the budget and then there’s less to distribute’). 454 
Most did not consider the indicator plant species brochure shown to them (Appendix 455 
A) sufficient on its own for getting started. Rather, the farmers suggested introductory 456 
hands-on training, contact information for expert support, online materials or even a 457 
smartphone app for species identification. Several farmers suggested the measure 458 
should be introduced in the obligatory continuing education meetings they attend. 459 
Opinions about an appropriate sum for the bonus payment were influenced by 460 
individuals’ perceptions of the proposed measure as either a low-cost maintenance of 461 
Long-term NMG becoming sources of noxious weeds; 
Peer perceptions Do not want to stand out as doing something different. 
possibly already suitable fields (low threshold) or establishment of new NMG (high 462 
threshold). Fifty euros was most frequently suggested as a minimum: ‘If you already 463 
have the species and don’t have to do anything, then small’. Two farmers expressed 464 
that the bonus ‘shouldn’t be too high’, as it could then attract people who are willing 465 
to cheat to get the subsidy. At the other end of the spectrum was consideration of costs 466 
and forgone income: one suggestion was for the bonus to be equivalent to average 467 
income for a field crop, and two farmers suggested that it should be equal to subsidy 468 
for buffer zones (currently 400 €/ha).  469 
The 17 fields visited during interviews fell into three groups according to the number 470 
of present indicator species (Table A.1). There were 12 sites (71%) that would already 471 
qualify for the bonus payment, four sites (24%) that might qualify under appropriate 472 
management (e.g. mowing of overgrown patches or bringing in the hay mass from 473 
another diverse field to seed), and one field (6%) that would require long-term 474 
management investment (heavily overgrown on nutrient-rich soil).  475 
 476 
Reputation and public perception 477 
Perceived effects of the approach on reputation was mostly positive. Concerns were 478 
formulated as ‘growing weeds’, ‘unmanaged sites’, and ‘bad farming’. Aesthetics of 479 
the overall farmland landscape and fields neighbouring others’ properties elicited 480 
particular concern.  Farmers suggested that some peers would reject the idea of 481 
farmers ‘counting flowers’. Most farmers expressed that, though their peers’ opinions 482 
matter to them, they make their own decisions. Some farmers also explained that 483 
attitudes change as new practices become normalised, and mentioned growing 484 
acceptance of organic agriculture as an example of how farmers’ attitudes toward 485 
environmental practices may change over time. Farmers generally felt that this type of 486 
environmental conservation activity would be received positively by the general 487 
public, and may even improve reputation of farmers and farming by showing that 488 
farming ‘isn’t just intensive production’. A minority expressed the view that ‘the 489 
public is always blaming farmers’ and the measure may be perceived as ‘more free 490 
subsidies’ to farmers. 491 
 492 
Public officials’ and advisors’ reactions 493 
We identified seven main themes in the responses by experts and officials: cost, 494 
administrative capacity, verifying results, governance context, evidence of results, 495 
farmer capacity, and misuse and cheating (Table 4). Public officials working with 496 
administration and inspection of AES were most critical of the PBR approach. They 497 
could not see how the new approach could fit into the current AES, or even any 498 
reason for changing the existing system. One administrative expert noted that since 499 
subsidies are no longer coupled to production, a basic attitude is that ‘nobody expects 500 
a result’. The gravest concerns were about ability to verify the results at the right time 501 
and in a way compatible with EU requirements (Table 4). Also, the current capacity 502 
of already overstretched personnel to monitor new things and learn new skills was 503 
questioned. 504 
Responses emphasised perceived administrative burden of the measure. Only one of 505 
the four interviewees representing administration and inspection considered the 506 
approach in terms of achieving agri-environment targets. None mentioned building of 507 
farmer capacity or other aspects of cultural capital in their responses. Responses to 508 
whether the proposed PBR scheme is better or worse than the existing management-509 
based measure were mostly noncommittal to negative. However, one official stated 510 
that there may be contexts in which the results-based scheme is better but that ‘the 511 
plant species component alone wouldn’t make the NMG measure better’. Two 512 
officials stated that adding more management requirements to the existing NMG 513 
scheme could achieve the biodiversity result aims of the proposed results-based 514 
prototype. Some of the experts viewed the proposed PBR as a ‘continuous growth’ 515 
model in which there was to be continuous increase in target species, which should be 516 
measured in some way.  517 
 518 
Table 4 Concerns about results-based approach amongst the experts, officials and advisors interviewed. 519 
Number of interviewees commenting on each theme in (). The most strongly emphasised concerns 520 
(frequency + amount of discussion) within and across themes are in bold. 521 
Theme Concerns 
Cost (5) Could result in more required inspections & more training, outside trainers; 
 
Fields would be divided into good & bad, which would place demands for more 
funds; 
 
Lowering basic payment to support the bonus payment would be unfair to 
farmers. 
Administrative capacity 
(4) 
High training threshold for inspectors to gain necessary skills/ indicator 
species knowledge. 
Verifying results (5) Planning & application in spring, species observation possible only in 
summer; 
 
Farmer & inspector must have same criteria and result;  
 
Farmer self-reporting isn't reliable or accepted; 
 
No biodiversity baseline info on the sites. 
Governance context (3) National programme must fit into EU framework/existing scheme 
structure;  
 
Ministry has said no new ‘norms’- aim is easing of existing burden. 
Result? (3) Is it better? Must have evidence. 
Farmer capacity (3) Farmers have to learn new skills; 
 
Farmers have to also learn a new scheme. 
Misuse & Cheating (3)  ‘If it doesn’t say what isn’t allowed, then everything is allowed’; 
 
EU could require higher rate of inspections if cheating is discovered to be 
higher;  
 
’Applicants want to maximise subsidies and will likely say they have the 
maximum-level of species needed’.  
 522 
From the government side, the response from a Ministry of Agriculture representative 523 
was relatively optimistic and was based on experience with many dramatic changes in 524 
the working priorities and modes that the Ministry has seen in recent decades. The 525 
respondent stressed that the ever-pressing expectations of society for improvements in 526 
the state of the environment forces the administration to experiment with delivery of 527 
results in cost-efficient ways.  528 
Agri-extension advisors were the most supportive of the approach, although they also 529 
acknowledged some risks similar to those raised by the administrators. The advisors 530 
saw the results-based thinking as providing genuinely new tools for enhancing 531 
biodiversity and landscape management in agricultural areas. Most respondents 532 
wished to see examples of successful piloting of the approach with solid evidence on 533 
performance and administrative costs.  534 
 535 
Discussion 536 
Suitability of the indicators for ecological targeting and as a guiding tool 537 
The list of indicator species appeared to be suitable for identifying NMG with high 538 
total species richness of vascular plants. By using seven indicator species as a 539 
threshold, the bonus payment could be channelled to the 10% of the NMG fields with 540 
nearly double mean species richness per plot compared to the scheme overall. As 541 
previous research has demonstrated, plant species richness and abundance of 542 
flowering plants in grassland habitats enhance, in turn, diversity and abundance of 543 
many other taxa, especially insects (Toivonen et al. 2016, Tscharntke et al. 2011, 544 
Siemann et al. 1998).   545 
The process of developing the indicator species set for NMG was aided by availability 546 
of the nationwide species data for the vegetation type concerned. The data collection 547 
methods of the national survey differed from the proposed method in the prototype 548 
scheme, which means that the survey results are only indicative of possible 549 
occurrence of indicators under the PBR scheme. In the vegetation survey, the 550 
surveyed transect was of a fixed length and included field edges, which usually have 551 
more diverse vegetation than the middle parts of fields (Boatman et al. 2011). The 552 
initial monitoring format for the prototype scheme was occurrence of indicator 553 
species along a single transect across the field, which reduces the impacts of edges 554 
but, in most cases, increases the total monitored area. Site visits conducted with the 555 
interviewees showed that NMGs are sometimes heterogeneous, with patches of higher 556 
diversity or specific clusters of indicator plants. Thus, a monitoring approach 557 
accounting for such heterogeneity would likely increase the number of sites 558 
qualifying for the bonus. Practicality of such an approach is more complicated but 559 
could be addressed by, for example, GPS-coordinate marked ‘hotspots’. Existing or 560 
trialled PBR schemes have taken various routes, with German Lander schemes 561 
requiring four reference species ‘regularly present’ in each third of the field and 562 
France’s Prairies fleuries scheme using broad indicator genera in addition to 563 
individual species, and restricting the scheme to targeted priority areas only (Magda 564 
et. al. 2015). 565 
Allen et al. (2014) stress that setting up an indicator threshold, such as number of 566 
indicator plant species, should not lead to a decline in ecological condition in the most 567 
biologically diverse sites. This can be prevented by having multiple indicator 568 
thresholds, or by ensuring that payments are dependent on the maintenance of 569 
baseline conditions. In our case, a management baseline of abstaining from chemical 570 
inputs serves the purpose. 571 
Prevalence of indicator species on NMG suggested by the farmers shows that farmers’ 572 
know-how of their fields (their potential conservation values often coinciding with 573 
poor production values) seems to be a sufficient baseline understanding among 574 
potential participants. Participant knowledge base is expected to increase with 575 
appropriate extension materials and advisory services and through hands-on 576 
experience. This is particularly important considering that, even after decades of 577 
payments for environmental conservation, farmers currently lack the knowledge and 578 
skills for managing for optimal biodiversity conservation. 579 
  580 
Farmers’ views on PBR approaches  581 
The number of participants represents a very small sample and farmers represent only 582 
one region and, therefore, we had no intention of deriving a statistically representative 583 
picture for the country. The results of the interviews gave us only an indication of the 584 
range, strength and commonality of views across the interviewed groups. Importantly, 585 
however, the farmers engaged with the scheme idea at a broad scale by generalizing it 586 
to Finland’s agriculture politics/policy as a whole and to other production and farming 587 
styles and conditions, and regardless of perceived applicability of the scheme to their 588 
own farm or context.  589 
The idea of results-based payment for biodiversity results was overwhelmingly 590 
accepted by the farmers in our study. This finding is in line with both anecdotal and 591 
published evidence from Germany, France and Ireland (Oppermann and Gujer 2003, 592 
de Sainte Marie 2010, Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010, Schwarz and Morkvenas 2012, 593 
Osbeck et al. 2013, Schroeder et al. 2013). In particular, farmers favour the flexibility 594 
offered by the PBR measures over the frustrations experienced by the detailed 595 
management instructions and inspections of conventional management-based 596 
approaches (Oppermann and Gujer 2003, de Sainte Marie 2010, Matzdorf and Lorenz 597 
2010). Also, most of the farmers participating in an even more demanding auctioning 598 
trial in Finland were supportive of the idea of linking payments to results 599 
(Grammatikopoulou et al. 2013). The farmers’ main concern with verification of 600 
results (in this case meeting the indicator species qualification) is consistent with the 601 
experiences in other countries (Oppermann and Gujer 2003, de Sainte Marie 2010, 602 
Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010). 603 
The two farmers whose initial responses to the proposed scheme were negative placed 604 
their criticism firmly in the context of perceived problems of AES overall. They 605 
attributed the bureaucracy problem to larger structural problems of the subsidy system 606 
itself, as well as to lack of trust in the bureau tasked with oversight in Finland. This 607 
criticism echoes previous findings that farmers are frustrated by detailed management 608 
instructions and inspections (Kaljonen 2006) and is only nominally related to the PBR 609 
approach and the proposed scheme. 610 
Studies accompanying trials or implementation of PBR measures cite a more 611 
meaningful engagement of farmers in adaptive management for best fit for their 612 
situation and context as a key success factor for such measures (Klimek et al. 2008, 613 
Swagermakers et al. 2009, Zabel and Roe 2009, Osbeck et al. 2013). Concurrently, 614 
adaptive management and self-monitoring supports and builds ‘cultural capital’ in 615 
environmental stewardship (Burton & Swartz 2013, Lowe et al. 1997). In our study, 616 
such cultural capital potential was evident in e.g. farmers’ express interest in best 617 
management practices and enthusiasm for the learning and sharing opportunities 618 
provided by the self-monitoring. 619 
 620 
Differences and similarities in farmer and expert stakeholder views  621 
Farmers, particularly those with ‘equivocal’ first impression of the proposed PBR 622 
bonus, and expert stakeholders brought up some similar concerns. Otherwise, they 623 
responded differently, with farmers mainly seeing opportunity and experts mainly 624 
seeing risk.  625 
Each group considered how a novel approach might impact their own profession (e.g. 626 
skills, knowledge acquisition) and workload, but farmers also expressed values related 627 
to landscape, nature and agricultural production. Many of the farmers exhibited a high 628 
degree of knowledge regarding rules and structures governing AES and agriculture 629 
policy, and this was reflected in their concerns and questions on implementation of 630 
the bonus. We discovered during interviews that two of the farmers had formerly been 631 
employed in AES development or inspection. The former subsidy inspector’s 632 
response was consistent with interviewed experts from the administrative sector. The 633 
farmer with several years experience in AES design-related tasks responded similarly 634 
to the extension advisory experts.  635 
Rejection by most of the experts of the PBR approach as incompatible with EU 636 
Commission’s framework is somewhat at odds with the fact that the approach is used 637 
in other EU countries, although some of those programmes are paid from regional, not 638 
EU funds (Allen et al. 2014). This reflects a currently low profile of the PBR 639 
approach at the EU level. Farmer self-monitoring was also criticised as unacceptable 640 
to the EU Commission, even though current action-based payments also rely on 641 
farmers’ self-reporting with only a possibility of inspection. The learning curve and 642 
training needed for inspectors was also purported to be unreasonably high. However, 643 
experiences with the PBR approach so far show that people administering measures 644 
with PBR components believe that, on balance, measures focused on results are more 645 
cost-effective than management-based schemes (Allen et al. 2014, Butler et al. 2010, 646 
Matzdorf and Lorenz 2010, Groth 2009). Further, it could be argued that more 647 
training for farm-level visits (inspectors) is needed regardless of approach: a recurring 648 
criticism of the inspection process from farmers is that inspectors are critical but 649 
unable to give advice for improvement and problem solving (Birge and Herzon 2014, 650 
Seppänen and Helenius 2004). This study’s finding that farmers wish now for more 651 
advice on good management practices for NMG is in line with others that adequate 652 
extension services are important to the success of programmes aiming for farmer 653 
engagement in conservation, regardless of the approach (Schroeder et al. 2015, Allen 654 
et al. 2014). 655 
Farmers had more faith in their capacity to gain skills necessary for the self-656 
monitoring than the expert stakeholders involved in administration and governance. 657 
The farmers’ assessment of themselves in this respect is supported by studies 658 
confirming enhanced ecological knowledge in several PBR measures (for example, de 659 
Sainte Marie 2010).  660 
Unlike many of the farmers, experts criticised but did not propose technical solutions 661 
to the monitoring issue. They were more concerned with cheating, whereas the 662 
majority of farmers who mentioned cheating mainly stated that people are not going 663 
to go to great lengths to cheat for a small bonus payment (cf. results in Klimek et al. 664 
2008). Potential cheating was mentioned by experts in our study far more often than 665 
achieving environmental benefits. There was little indication that the subsidy 666 
administrators interviewed view farmers as partners in conservation or stakeholders 667 
whose conservation skills and attitudes can be developed. These results show a need 668 
for orientation toward cultural capital thinking within the administrative structures if 669 
PBR measures are introduced.  670 
 671 
Experimenting for policy learning 672 
We cannot, based on this research, state that the PBR measure modification is per se 673 
better than the present management-based measure in terms of its effectiveness to 674 
deliver ecological quality. This would require a targeted study comparing the 675 
outcomes of two measure alternatives under comparable conditions. The degree to 676 
which agri-environment type measures perform for biodiversity benefits depends on a 677 
far greater range of factors than studied here (as reviewed in Allen et al. 2014). 678 
However, the approach explicitly encourages “innovation, self-help and mutual 679 
learning, and finding positive ways of harnessing the power of peer group pressure” 680 
(ibid pp. 115). Indeed, experiences from the French flowering meadows competitions 681 
indicate that the agro-ecological emphasis of combining agronomic and biodiversity 682 
aims result in a collective learning process for all participants (Magda et al. 2015).  683 
Our results call for further experimentation aimed at policy learning. With specific 684 
recommendations from the EU for testing the result-based approaches as means for 685 
improving AES efficiency, the growing body of evidence that the PBR approach 686 
provides numerous benefits, and our findings showing farmer interest in the approach, 687 
the time might be ripe in Finland for piloting results-based payments for biodiversity 688 
management. The piloting should target different regions. Because agricultural policy 689 
is mandated on the national level, with only limited regional targeting, there is a 690 
general uniformity for policy implementation throughout the country. However, it is 691 
possible that new perspectives may be found in other regions and among other 692 
farming types due to factors that are not relevant to the cereal farmers in the Uusimaa 693 
region. Livestock farms have a larger range of options at their disposal for grasslands 694 
compared to non-livestock farms that may struggle with grazing or haying 695 
requirements of other schemes. Results may differ also in the regions with high levels 696 
of agricultural abandonment. Also other target biotopes, such as traditional or semi-697 
natural biotopes, should be tested for a result-based approach to policy delivery. 698 
Indicator development for other environmental targets, such as reducing nutrient 699 
runoff, require independent trials.  700 
Experimentation should incorporate systematic monitoring of the ecological and 701 
economic efficacy of the PBR approach as compared to the conventional 702 
management-based measures. Given the importance of farmer attitudes and 703 
management practices to scheme outcome, these should also be assessed and 704 
monitored. With respect to administrative officials, the experimentation, however, 705 
calls for an experimental mind and a licence to fail (cf. Primmer and Hildén 2015). 706 
According to our findings, such an experimental attitude might be the trickiest thing 707 
to achieve in the current practice and framework of agri-environmental schemes (cf. 708 
Kaljonen 2011). 709 
 710 
Conclusions 711 
The bonus scheme has the potential to target the most biologically diverse sites by 712 
possible channelling of just 5% of the total current expenditure on the measure to 713 
retention and management of parcels with nearly double mean species richness per 714 
plot compared to the current scheme. This can be regarded as a high efficiency in 715 
terms of environmental outcomes. The indicator species list also proved suitable for 716 
identifying NMG with high total species richness of vascular plants and appeared 717 
feasible in the eyes of the farmers. 718 
Farmers were mainly positive about the PBR approach and the findings show a 719 
possibility for developing farmer capacity and cultural capital in managing for 720 
biodiversity conservation. Policy officials in charge of the implementation of the agri-721 
environmental schemes were the most critical towards the monitoring of the results-722 
based approach. Change from same-for-all management-based measures to payments 723 
tailored by results will require new thinking from AES officials. 724 
Further experimentation and piloting, in different regions and for more production 725 
types, is needed before implementation of the results-based approach. According to 726 
our results, the experiments should focus on finding a balance between self-727 
monitoring and inspection: verification should be able to take the heterogeneity of 728 
NMG sites into account but must not be overly cumbersome for either farmers or 729 
inspectors. Also, learning and capacity building for farmers and inspectors is needed. 730 
Close co-operation with policy officials, farmers and researchers in designing and 731 
monitoring the experiments is needed for overcoming obstacles. Lessons learned in 732 
other countries may aid in finding solutions to issues brought up by the experts 733 
interviewed, including verification and compatibility with national and EU 734 
requirements.  735 
   736 
Acknowledgements 737 
We thank all the participants in the study and acknowledge funding of Emil Aaltonen 738 
Foundation for funding, Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation, and R. Erik Serlachius 739 
Foundations. Species data generation was funded by the Finnish Ministry of 740 
Agriculture and Forestry (Project Number 2589/311/2009). We thank the two 741 
anonymous reviewers who reviewed this manuscript. 742 
 743 
References 744 
Allen, B., Hart, K., Radley, G., Tucker, G., Keenleyside, C., Oppermann, R., 745 
Underwood, E., Menadue, H.,Poux, X., Beaufoy, G., Herzon, I., Povellato, A., Vanni, 746 
F., Pražan, J., Hudson, T., Yellachich, N., 2014. Biodiversity protection through 747 
results based remuneration of ecological achievement. Report Prepared for the 748 
European Commission, DG Environment. Institute for European Environmental 749 
Policy, London. 167 pp.  750 
Arponen, A., Heikkinen, R.K., Paloniemi, R., Pöyry, J., Similä, J., Kuussaari, M., 751 
2013. Improving conservation planning for semi-natural grasslands: integrating 752 
connectivity into agri-environment schemes. Biol Conserv 160, 234–241. 753 
Boatman, N.D., Jones, N.E., Conyers, S.T., Pietravalle, S., 2011. Development of 754 
plant communities on set-aside in England. Agr Ecosys Environ 143, 8–19. 755 
Batáry, P., Dicks, L.V., Kleijn, D., & Sutherland, W.J., 2015. The role of agri-756 
environment schemes in conservation and environmental management. Conserv Biol 757 
29, 1006–1016. 758 
Battin, J., 2004. When good animals love bad habitats: ecological traps and the 759 
conservation of animal populations. Conserv Biol 18,1482–1491. 760 
Berniger, K., 2012. Payment for ecosystem services and outcome-based approach in 761 
agri-environment schemes: Can we find a way forward? Baltic Compass Seminar 762 
report. Lohja, Finland. 12 pp. 763 
http://www.balticcompass.org/PDF/Reports/PES_Finland_seminarreport.pdf 764 
[accessed 4.8.2016]  765 
Bertke, E., Klimek, S. & Wittig, B., 2008. Developing result-orientated payment 766 
schemes for environmental services in grasslands: results from two case studies in 767 
North-western Germany. Biodiversity 9, 91–95. 768 
Birge, T. & Herzon, I. 2014. Farmer and landowner motivations and experiences in 769 
managing rare semi-natural biotopes: A case from Finland. Land Use Policy 41, 128–770 
137. 771 
Braun, V. & Clarke, V., 2006. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qual Res 772 
Psycol. 3(2), 77–101.  773 
Burren Life Programme, 2015. http://burrenlife.com/the-burren/ [accessed 3.3.2016] 774 
Burton, R.J.F. & Paragahawewa, U., 2011. Creating culturally sustainable agr-775 
environmental schemes. J Rural Stud 27, 95–104. 776 
Burton, R.J.F & Schwartz, G., 2013 Result-oriented agri-environmental schemes in 777 
Europe and their potential for promoting behavioural change. Land Use Policy 30, 778 
628–641. 779 
Butler, S.J., Boccaccio, I., Gregory, R.D., Vorisek, P. & Norris, K., 2010. Quantifying 780 
the impact of landuse change to European farmland bird populations. Agr Ecosys 781 
Environ 137, 348–357. 782 
Creswell, J. W., Plano Clark, V. L., Gutmann, M., & Hanson, W. (2003). Advanced 783 
mixed methods research designs. In A. Tashakkori & C. Teddlie (Eds.), Handbook of 784 
mixed methods in social and behavioral research (pp. 209–240). Thousand Oaks, CA: 785 
Sage. 786 
De Sainte Marie, S., 2010. Let Hundreds of Flowers Bloom? The Rising of Local 787 
Authorities and the Governance of Agricultural Affairs in the French Countryside. 788 
Paper presented at the 50th Congress of the European Regional Science Association 789 
in Jönköping (Sweden), 19–23 August 2010. 790 
De Sainte Marie, C., 2014. Rethinking agri-environmental schemes. A result-oriented 791 
approach to the management of species-rich grasslands in France. J Environ Plann 792 
Man 57, 704–719. 793 
de Snoo, G.R., Herzon, I, Staats, H., Burton, Rob J.F., Schindler, S., van Dijk, J., 794 
Lokhorst, A.M., Bullock, J., Lobley, M., Wrbka, T., Schwarz, G., Musters, C.J.M., 795 
2012. Towards Effective Nature Conservation on Farmland: Making Farmers Matter. 796 
Conserv Lett 6, 66–72. 797 
EEA (European Environment Agency), 2004. High nature value farmland: 798 
Characteristics, trends and policy challenges. Copenhagen. 31 pp. 799 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/report_2004_1 [accessed 15.12.2015] 800 
EC (European Commission), 2015a. MEKA programme B4 - species rich grassland 801 
scheme - Germany, Baden-Württemberg. Last updated: 29.05.2015. 802 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/rbaps/fiche/index_en.htm [accessed 803 
06.03.2016] 804 
EC (European Commission) 2015b. EU agriculture spending: focused on results. 805 
September 2015. 8pp. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/pdf/cap-spending-806 
09-2015_en.pdf [accessed 06.03.2016] 807 
European Court of Auditors, 2011. Is Agri-environment support well designed and 808 
managed? Special report no. 7/2011. European Union, Luxembourg. 75 pp. 809 
http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/8772726.PDF [accessed 15.12.2015] 810 
European Network for Rural Development and European Commission, 2010. Report 811 
on the Contribution of the European Network for Rural Development to the Public 812 
debate on the Common Agricultural Policy after 2013 (13/07/2010). European 813 
Commission, Brussels. http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/enrd-static/fms/pdf/DAB81B97-814 
9E9B-F50F-6F18-C76EBF6B1A4A.pdf [accessed 24.06.11]. 815 
Grammatikopoulou, I., Pouta, E., & Iho, A., 2013. Willingness of farmers to 816 
participate in agri-environmental auctions in Finland. Food Econ 9, 215–230. 817 
Groth, M., 2009. The transferability and performance of payment-by-results 818 
biodiversity conservation procurement auctions: empirical evidence from 819 
northernmost Germany. Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Luneburg. 820 
35 pp. http://www.uni-lueneburg.de/fb2/vwl/papers/wp_119_Upload.pdf [accessed 821 
15.12.2015] 822 
Helenius, J. & Seppänen, L., 2004. Do inspection practices in organic agriculture 823 
serve organic values? A case study from Finland. Agr Hum Values 21, 1–13. 824 
Herzon, I. & Mikk, M., 2008. Farmers' perceptions of biodiversity and their 825 
willingness to enhance it through agri-environment schemes: A comparative study 826 
from Estonia and Finland. J Nat Conserv 15, 10–25. 827 
Herzon, I., Toivonen, M., Kankaanpää, O., Mäkinen, T., Delasalle, M., Le Barh, C., 828 
Swiderski, C. & Helenius, J., 2012. Luonnonhoitopeltojen ympäristöhyödyt. In: 829 
Heliölä, J. & Herzon, I. (eds.) Maatilan luontoarvojen mittaaminen – 830 
luonnonhoitopellot, erityistukialueet ja tilataso. Suomen ympäristö 26/2012, Luonto, 831 
91 pp. Suomen ympäristökeskus. (In Finnish with English summary). 832 
Hämet-Ahti, L., Suominen, J., Ulvinen, T. & Uotila, P., (Eds.) 1998. Retkeilykasvio 833 
(Field Flora of Finland), fourth ed. Finnish Museum of Natural History, Botanical 834 
Museum, Helsinki. 656 pp. 835 
IBM Corp, 2015. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 23. Armonk, NY: IBM 836 
Corp.  837 
Kaljonen, M. 2006. Co-construction of agency and environmental management. The 838 
case of agri—environmental policy implementation at the Finnish farms. J Rural Stud 839 
22: 205–216. 840 
Kaljonen, M., 2008. Bringing back the lost biotopes. The practice of regional 841 
biodiversity management planning in Finland. J Environ Plann Manag 10, 113–132. 842 
Kaljonen, M., 2011. Caught between standardization and complexity. Study on the 843 
institutional ambiguities of agri-environmental policy implementation in Finland. 844 
Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1594. University of Tampere. Tampere University 845 
Press, Tampere. 121 pp. 846 
Keenleyside C., Allen B., Hart K., Menadue H., Stefanova V., Prazan J., Herzon I., 847 
Clement T., Povellato A., Maciejczak M., Boatman N., 2011. Delivering 848 
environmental benefits through entry level agri-environment schemes in the EU. 849 
Report Prepared for DG Environment. Institute for European Environmental Policy: 850 
London. 851 
Kemppainen, R. & Lehtomaa, L., 2009. The state and targets for traditional biotopes. 852 
The national evaluation of the regional management plans for traditional biotopes. 853 
[Perinnebiotooppien hoidon tila ja tavoitteet]. The West-South Regional Environment 854 
Center 2/2009. 855 
Kleijn, D., Rundlöf, M., Scheper, J., Smith, H.G., Tscharntke, T., 2011. Does 856 
conservation on farmland contribute to halting the biodiversity decline? Trends Ecol 857 
Evol 26, 474–481. 858 
Klimek, S., Richter gen. Kemmermann, A., Steinmann, H-H., Freese, J., Isselstein, J., 859 
2008. Rewarding farmers for delivering vascular plant diversity in managed 860 
grasslands: A transdisciplinary case-study approach. Biol Conserv 141, 2888–2897. 861 
Kuussaari, M., Heliölä, J., Herzon, I., Tiainen, J., Ekroos, J. 2013. Luonnon 862 
monimuotoisuus maatalousalueilla. Aakkula, J. ja Leppänen, J. (toimit.) Maatalouden 863 
ympäristötuen vaikuttavuuden seurantatutkimus (MYTVAS 3). Maa- ja 864 
metsätalousministeriö 3/2014. Suomen Yliopistopaino Oy, Helsinki. pp. 86-132. (in 865 
Finnish). [Biodiversity in the agricultural environment. In: Follow-up study on the 866 
impacts of agri-environment measures (MYTVAS 3) – Final report]. 867 
Lowe, P., Clark, J., Seymour, S., Ward, N., 1997. Moralizing the environment. 868 
Countryside change, farming and pollution. UCL Press, London 224pp. 869 
Magda, D., de St. Marie, C., Plantureux, S., Agreil, C., Amioud, B., Mestelan, P., 870 
Mihout, S., 2015. Integrating agricultural and ecological goals into the management 871 
of species-rich grasslands_ learning from the flowering meadows competition in 872 
France. Environ Manage 56,1053-1064. 873 
Marggraf, R., 2003. Comparative assessment of agri-environment programmes in 874 
federal states of Germany. Agr Ecosys Environ 98, 507–516. 875 
Matzdorf, B., Kaiser, T., Rohner, M-S., 2008. Developing biodiversity indicators to 876 
design efficient agri-environmental schemes for extensively used grassland. Ecol 877 
Indic 8, 256–269. 878 
Matzdorf, B. & Lorenz, J., 2010. How cost-effective are result-oriented agri-879 
environmental measures? An empirical analysis in Germany. Land Use Policy 27, 880 
535–544. 881 
McKenzie, A.J., Emery, S.B., Franks, J.R. & Whittingham, M.J., 2013. Landscape-882 
scale conservation: collaborative agri-environment schemes could benefit both 883 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, but will farmers be willing to participate? J Appl 884 
Biol 50(5), 1274-1280. 885 
Natural Resources Institute Finland 2015. Utilized agricultural area 2015. 886 
http://stat.luke.fi/en/utilised-agricultural-area [accessed 30.02.2016] 887 
Natural Resources Institute Finland, 2016. Statistics database 888 
http://statdb.luke.fi/PXWeb/pxweb/en/LUKE/LUKE__02%20Maatalous__02%20Rak889 
enne__02%20Maatalous-890 
%20ja%20puutarhayritysten%20rakenne/?tablelist=true&rxid=001bc7da-70f4-47c4-891 
a6c2-c9100d8b50db [accessed 7.10.2016]. 892 
Niemi, J. & Ahlstedt, J., (Eds). 2014. Suomen maatalous ja maaseutuelinkeinot 2014. 893 
MTT Taloustutkimus, julkaisuja 115. MTT Taloustutkimus. (in Finnish). [Finnish 894 
agriculture and rural livelihoods 2014]. 895 
https://portal.mtt.fi/portal/page/portal/mtt/mtt/julkaisut/suomenmaatalousjamaaseutuel896 
inkeinot/jul115_SM2014.pdf [accessed 15.12.2015]  897 
Oppermann, R. & Gujer, H. U., (Eds.) 2003. Artenreiches Grünland- Bewerten Und 898 
Fördern: MEKA Und ÖQV in Der Praxis. (in German). Ulmer, Eugen, GmbH & Co. 899 
199 pp. 900 
Osbeck, M., Schwarz, G. & Morkvenas, Z., 2013. Dialogue on ecosystem services, 901 
payments and outcome-based approach. Background Brief. SEI Stockholm 902 
Environment Institute. 16 p. http://www.sei-903 
international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Air-land-water-904 
resources/BC-2013-PES-Background-Brief.pdf  905 
Primmer, E. & Hildén, M., 2015. Experimentation and sustainability: a paradox or an 906 
opportunity for institutional learning? Ratkaisuja blog, Finnish Environment Institute. 907 
http://www.syke.fi/fi-908 
FI/SYKE_Info/Viestintaaineistot/Ratkaisujablogi/Eeva_Primmer_Mikael_Hilden_Ex909 
perimentati%2836063%29 [accessed 15.12.2015] 910 
Pykälä, J., 2001. Perinteinen karjatalous luonnon monimuotoisuuden ylläpitäjänä. 911 
Suomen ympäristö 495. Helsinki: Suomen ympäristökeskus. 205 pp. 912 
Rassi, P., Hyvärinen, E., Juslén, A., Mannerkoski, I. (Eds.) 2010. The 2010 Red List 913 
of Finnish Species. Ministry of the Environment and Finnish Environment Institute, 914 
Helsinki. 685 pp. 915 
Riedel S., Walter T., Herzog F., 2012. Switzerland: Chapter 4. In: High Nature Value 916 
Farming in Europe. Ubstadt-Weiher, Publ. R. Oppermann, G. Beaufoy & G. Jones, 917 
Verlag Regionalkultur. 2012, p. 420-433. ISBN 978-3-89735-657-3. 918 
Schroeder, L.A., Isselstein, J., Chaplin, S., Peel, S., 2013. Agri-environment schemes: 919 
Farmers’ acceptance and perception of potential ‘Payment by Result s’ in grassland—920 
A case study in England. Land Use Policy 32, 134–144. 921 
Schroeder, L.A., Chaplin, S., Isselstein, J., 2015. What influences farmers’ acceptance 922 
of agri-environment schemes? An ex-post application of the ‘Theory of Planned 923 
Behaviour’. Landbauforschung 65, 15–28. 924 
Seppänen, L. & Helenius, J., 2004. Do inspection practices in organic agriculture 925 
serve organic values? A case study from Finland. Agric. Human Values 21, 1–13. 926 
Siemann, E., Tilman, D., Haarstad, J., Ritchie, M., 1998. Experimental tests of the 927 
dependence of arthropod diversity on plant diversity. Am Nat 152, 738–750. 928 
Swagemakers, P., Wiskerke, H., Van Der Ploeg, J.D., 2009. Linking birds, fields and 929 
farmers. J Environ Manage 90, 185–192. 930 
Toivonen, M., Herzon, I., Helenius, J., 2013. Environmental Fallows as a new policy 931 
tool to safeguard farmland biodiversity in Finland. Biol Conserv 159, 355–366. 932 
Toivonen, M., Herzon, I., Kuussaari, M., 2015. Differing effects of fallow type and 933 
landscape structure on the occurrence of plants, pollinators and birds on 934 
environmental fallows in Finland. Biol Conserv 181, 36–43. 935 
Toivonen, M., Herzon, I. & Kuussaari, M. 2016. Community composition of 936 
butterflies and bumblebees in fallows: niche breadth and dispersal capacity modify 937 
responses to fallow type and landscape. J Insect Conserv 20, 23–34. 938 
Tscharntke, T., Batáry, P., Dormann, C.F., 2011. Set-aside management: How do 939 
succession, sowing patterns and landscape context affect biodiversity? Agr Ecosys 940 
Environ 143, 37–44. 941 
Whittingham, M.J., 2007. Will agri-environment schemes deliver substantial gain, 942 
and if not why not? J App Ecol 44, 1–5. 943 
Wilson, G.A., Hart, K., 2001. Farmer participation in agri-environmental schemes: 944 
towards conservation-oriented thinking? Sociol Ruralis. 41 (2), 254–274. 945 
Yin, R. 2014. Case Study Research. Design and methods. 5th Edition. Thousand Oaks, 946 
CA: Sage Publications Inc.  947 
Zabel, A. & Roe, B., 2009. Optimal design of pro-conservation incentives. Ecol Econ 948 
69, 126–134. 949 
  950 
Appendices 951 
Appendix A 1. Leaflet for farmers with the indicator plant species used in the farmer interviews 952 
about the hypothetical bonus payment for nature management fields. English common names 953 
added to leaflet for publication. 954 
 955 
 956 
Appendix A 2 Leaflet text for farmers describing the prototype bonus scheme. Farmers were 957 
provided with common names for indicator species (left hand side). These correspond to the 958 
numbers on the photo guide (Appendix A 1). Space is provided for recording any indicator 959 
species found. Appendices A 1 and 2 are translations of the original Finnish language leaflet. 960 
 961 
 962 
Table A 1. List of 24 indicator species and their occurrence (in percent) on the nature management 963 
grasslands (n = 104) (Toivonen et al. 2013), and, in brackets, on old nature management grasslands 964 
(n=20) (Toivonen et al. 2015). Ease to recognise is assessed by the authors for a species or group of 965 
related species. Habitat after Hämet-Ahti et al. (1998). Status is according to the national Red list 966 
(Rassi et al. 2010) and positive indicator of diverse grassland vegetation after Pykälä et al. (2001). 967 
Percentage of registrations is during field visits with farmers in connections to interviews in this study 968 
(n = 17). 969 
Name Frequ-
ency 
Ease of 
recog-
nition 
Habitat 
 
Region Status Regist-
ered 
during 
field 
visits, 
% 
Achillea 
ptarmica 
36 (50) 1 Meadows, boundaries   41 
Ajuga 
pyramidalis 
0 (5) 3 Meadows, forest edges  South Near threatened, 
positive indicator 
0 
Alchemilla spp. 14 (35) 2 Meadows, boundaries   65 
Campanula 
glomerata 
3 (5) 3 Meadows, forest edges  East Positive indicator 12 
Campanula 
patula1 / 
persicifolia2 
34 (70) 2 1  Meadows, boundaries, fallows  
2  Lush meadows 
2  
South-
West 
2 Positive indicator 82 
Centaurea 
jacea1 / 
phrygia2 
7 (30) 2 1  Dry meadows, boundaries  
2  Meadows, boundaries 
1  South  
2  East 
Positive indicator 47 
Dactylorhiza 0 (5) 3 Moist meadows, bogs  1Vulnerable 0 
incarnate1 / 
maculata 
Dianthus 
deltoides 
2 (10) 3 Dry meadows, boundaries  Near threatened, 
positive indicator 
18 
Fragaria vesca 3 (30) 2 Meadows, boundaries  Positive indicator 24 
Galium boreale 10 (0) 3 Meadows, forest edges  Positive indicator  41 
Galium verum 0 (10) 2 Dry meadows, boundaries South-
West 
Vulnerable, positive 
indicator 
6 
Hypericum 
maculatum1 / 
perforatum2 
25 (50) 2 1  Meadows, forest edges 
2  Rocky hills, juniper groves, 
boundaries 
2 South 2 Positive indicator 53 
Knautia 
arvensis1/ 
Succisa 
pratensis2 
0 3 Meadows, boundaries, fallows 1 East 
2  
South-
West 
Positive indicator 6 
Lathyrus 
pratensis 
49 (90) 1 Meadows, boundaries, hay fields  Positive indicator 94 
Leucanthemum 
vulgare 
18 (50) 1 Meadows, boundaries, forest 
edges 
 Positive indicator 65 
Lychnis flos-
cuculi 
3 (5) 3 Damp meadows, shores, springs, 
ditches 
 Positive indicator 18 
Lysimachia spp. 11 (15) 2 Shores, damp meadows, ditches, 
swamps 
  12 
Pilosella/Hiera
cium group 
17 (15) 3 Dry meadows, boundaries, forest 
margins, open forests, shores, 
rocky outcrops 
  18 
Rhinanthus 
serotinus1 / 
minor2 
11 (10) 3 1 Boundaries, fallows 
2  Boundaries, meadows 
 Positive indicator 6 
Rubus arcticus  4  1 Damp meadows, boundaries Central Positive indicator 0 
Tragopogon 
pratensis 
1 (20) 2 Railway embankments, roadsides, 
field margins 
South  0 
“Yellow 
clover” 
Trifolium 
aureum1 / 
spadiceum2 
2 (15) 3 1 Dry meadows 
2  Meadows 
1 East 
 
Near threatened, 
positive indicator 
29 
Valeriana 
sambucifolia1 / 
officinalis2 
8 (5) 2 Shore meadows, stream banks, 
fallows, forest-edges 
1 West 
2 South 
 29 
Vicia spp. 74 (85) 1 Meadows, fields, boundaries, 
shores  
  100 
 970 
Table A 2. Criteria for inclusion and exclusion for indicator species list 971 
Included species: Examples 
Mainly ubiquitous by geographical coverage and growing conditions Leucanthemum vulgare, Achillea ptarmica  
Some specific to limited parts of the country and in specific abiotic 
conditions (incl. wet sites along coastal and inland waters, fields with 
numerous open ditches, and dry and nutrient-poor sandy soil sites). 
Valeriana sambucifolia/officinalis, 
Dactylorhiza incarnate/maculata, Rubus 
arcticus 
Some commonly occurring on NMG fields Lathyrus pratensis, Vicia spp. 
Some of high conservation value occurring only occasionally in old 
grassland vegetation.  
Ajuga pyramidalis, Dianthus deltoides 
Excluded species:  
Tolerant of high management intensity (either high soil fertility or 
mowing/grazing pressure) 
Urtica dioica, Trifolium repens 
Found almost at every focus field type Achillea millefolium 
Noxious weeds Cirsium arvense, Equisetum arvense 
Difficult to identify All Poaceae, sedges and rushes, most 
Apiaceae 
 972 
Appendix B. Farmer interview guide (abridged) 973 
Prior to interview questions, interviewee read an introduction to the research text to interviewees, asked 974 
if they had any questions before beginning, and secured permission to record the interview.   975 
I. Background 976 
a. Personal: sex, age, highest level of education, participation or membership in 977 
hunting/agricultural/environmental orgs.  978 
b. Farm: farm size (ha), organic or conventional, hunting on farm, honey production on farm, 979 
on-farm income generation in addition to farming (e.g. tourism, direct sales, courses, etc). 980 
c. Existing or past voluntary environmental subsidies: Nature management grassland 981 
(research focus): general area and history, how far from main farm (visible or ‘hidden’), main 982 
reasons for scheme participation; other nature management fields & biodiversity fields (incl. 983 
traditional rural biotopes, buffer zones, catch crops, game field, etc), any other ‘special’ 984 
subsidies; possible impact of the ‘greening’ requirement on nature management grassland.   985 
II. Payment-by-results bonus prototype 986 
a. Introduce prototype (leaflet text & indicator species photos)  987 
b. First impressions: interest in participating in scheme or not (reasons) 988 
c. Open questions: perceived risks; requirements for success (e.g. extension services, self-989 
monitoring, inspection); necessary skills- do you have those skills?; affect on reputation- peer 990 
and society; own ideas to achieve similar/better result; other views, including on fairness and 991 
effectiveness of proposed scheme, impact on workload, etc. 992 
III  Attitude 993 
a. ‘Good Farmer’: What is a ‘good farmer’/ ‘good farming’? Is nature management grassland 994 
suitable to ‘good farmer/farming’? 995 
b. Nature stewardship: non-production activities farmer/ farm family engages in for nature, 996 
landscape management (e.g. nesting boxes for birds constructed wetland, hunting of invasive 997 
species, etc.); ‘extra’ activities to reduce farming impact on nature (e.g. checking for birds’ 998 
nests before spring tractor work on the field). 999 
c. Farm natural history: Changes over time, expected changes for future. 1000 
d. Education: continuing education courses, activities, professional competitions or awards. 1001 
e. Social network: Are opinions of peers important to you? How might peers view this scheme 1002 
or your participation in it? Affect on your actions? 1003 
Agri-environmental subsidy effect on farm income: Agri-environmental subsidy as a percentage of 1004 
farm’s total income. 1005 
Any further comments or questions  1006 
 1007 
Appendix C. Experts and officials (‘expert stakeholders’) interview guide  1008 
Introduction text 1009 
In Finland, the agri-environment scheme (AES) is entirely based on prescribed management actions, 1010 
and the payment amount is compensation based on calculations of real costs and lost income. Thus, the 1011 
system lacks any incentive mechanism for achieving better results or applying the most appropriate 1012 
site-specific management. An alternative is results-based payment where payment is partially or fully 1013 
tied to results. The European Commission and Parliament are interested in this option and funded a 1014 
report on it: (Biodiversity protection through results based remuneration of ecological achievement 1015 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/rbaps/index_en.htm). 1016 
The aim of this research is to clarify how Finland could employ the results-based payment approach for 1017 
biodiversity conservation. In the study we develop a hypothetical results-based prototype and interview 1018 
farmers and representatives of other expert stakeholder groups. 1019 
Nature management grassland (NMG) measure is used in the study as an example of how a possible 1020 
results-based measure could be applied as an incentive for biodiversity management. Nature 1021 
management grasslands have been shown to be one of the most effective AES measures for 1022 
maintenance of biodiversity in the typical farmland environs in Finland. The measure is quite popular 1023 
in Finland. Previous research shows that plant species richness varies on NMG parcels from between 5 1024 
and 50 species (in transect counts). Appropriate management for specific parcel contexts and farmer 1025 
capacity would help in achieving results. 1026 
 1027 
I General 1028 
1. Why, in your opinion, is results-based payment not used in Finland? Please provide any 1029 
references you may have to support your opinion.  1030 
2. Does your professional group view the results-based payment approach positively or 1031 
negatively in Finland? Other groups (farmers, governance, inspectors, advisors, etc). Is there 1032 
evidence of this? 1033 
3. How broad (e.g. political) prerequisites would have to be realised for results-based approach 1034 
to achieve support in Finland?  1035 
II Payment-by-results bonus prototype 1036 
Present prototype (leaflet of indicator species) and 1037 
III Specific opinions 1038 
1. From your perspective, what risks do you see with the results-based approach?  1039 
2. What prerequisites would you place on the approach, e.g extension services, self-monitoring, 1040 
external inspection, etc.  1041 
3. In your opinion, are any specific skills needed in order to achieve the goals of the proposed 1042 
measure? Do you have those skills? 1043 
4. In your opinion, does the approach strengthen or weaken AES reputation/ public perception in 1044 
Finland?  1045 
5. Would the proposed results-based measure work better or worse than the existing 1046 
management-based NMG measure in Finland? Please, explain your response.  1047 
IV  Key results from farmer interviews. 1048 
Any further comments or questions  1049 
 1050 
